Strategy of moral hazard controlling in marine disaster insurance market
ZHENG Hui1, WANG Chun-yang2
1. College of Economy, Ocean University of China, Qingdao 266100, China;
2. School of Business, Macau University of Science Technology, Macau 999078, China
Abstract：In disaster insurance market, which is similar with policy-oriented agricultural insurance, high-risk applicants tend to disguise as low-risk ones, taking advantage of information asymmetry. Moral hazard decreases insurers' underwriting willingness and insurants' payment willingness, which condition the efficiency of disaster insurance market. The paper provided the behavioral strategys in disaster insurance market according to signal transmission mechanism and solved the profit functions. By analyzing the sub-game refined Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the author offered pricing constraints for disaster insurance under moral risk and the corresponding suggestions.
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