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Volume 34 Issue 4
Jul.  2015
Article Contents

Citation:

Strategy of moral hazard controlling in marine disaster insurance market

  • Received Date: 2014-02-20
    Accepted Date: 2014-04-30
  • In disaster insurance market, which is similar with policy-oriented agricultural insurance, high-risk applicants tend to disguise as low-risk ones, taking advantage of information asymmetry. Moral hazard decreases insurers' underwriting willingness and insurants' payment willingness, which condition the efficiency of disaster insurance market. The paper provided the behavioral strategys in disaster insurance market according to signal transmission mechanism and solved the profit functions. By analyzing the sub-game refined Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the author offered pricing constraints for disaster insurance under moral risk and the corresponding suggestions.
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  • [1] 范垂仁.中国水旱灾害长期预报:理论方法实践[M].北京:水利水电出版社,2008.[2]石 兴.巨灾风险可保性与巨灾保险研究[M].北京:中国金融出版社,2010.[3]祝向军.道德风险与保险商品价格形成的博弈分析[J].财经研究,2004,30(3):40-48.[6]SPENCE A M.Market signaling[M].Mass:Harvard University Press,1974.[9]黄祖梅,李 萍,孙 慧.森林保险市场的信号甄别和激励机制[J].湖北工业大学学报,2006,21(6):89-91.[12]秦奕菲,李晓林.保险市场逆向选择问题研究新进展[J].经济学动态,2008(3):91-94.[13]杨美琴,龚日朝,刘 玲.保险市场基于保费信号的信号传递博弈模型分析[J].湖南科技大学学报:社会科学版,2008,11(6):100-103.[14]朱曙光,锁凌燕.保险市场逆向选择的信号传递博弈研究[J].保险研究,2011(11):89-97.[15]夏 天,叶民强.企业战略联盟稳定性的动态博弈分析[J].华侨大学学报:自然科学版,2007,28(1):102-106.
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Strategy of moral hazard controlling in marine disaster insurance market

  • 1. College of Economy, Ocean University of China, Qingdao 266100, China;
  • 2. School of Business, Macau University of Science Technology, Macau 999078, China

Abstract: In disaster insurance market, which is similar with policy-oriented agricultural insurance, high-risk applicants tend to disguise as low-risk ones, taking advantage of information asymmetry. Moral hazard decreases insurers' underwriting willingness and insurants' payment willingness, which condition the efficiency of disaster insurance market. The paper provided the behavioral strategys in disaster insurance market according to signal transmission mechanism and solved the profit functions. By analyzing the sub-game refined Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the author offered pricing constraints for disaster insurance under moral risk and the corresponding suggestions.

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